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Abstract – Scientific disciplines face concerns about replicability and statistical inference, and these concerns are 
also relevant in animal cognition research. This paper presents a first attempt to assess how researchers make and 
publish claims about animal physical cognition, and the statistical inferences they use to support them. We surveyed 
116 published experiments from 63 papers on physical cognition, covering 43 different species. The most common 
tasks in our sample were trap-tube tasks (14 papers), other tool use tasks (13 papers), means-end understanding and 
string-pulling tasks (11 papers), object choice and object permanence tasks (9 papers) and access tasks (5 papers). 
This sample is not representative of the full scope of physical cognition research; however, it does provide data on 
the types of statistical design and publication decisions researchers have adopted. Across the 116 experiments, the 
median sample size was 7. Depending on the definitions we used, we estimated that between 44% and 59% of our 
sample of papers made positive claims about animals’ physical cognitive abilities, between 24% and 46% made 
inconclusive claims, and between 10% and 17% made negative claims. Several failures of animals to pass physical 
cognition tasks were reported. Although our measures had low inter-observer reliability, these findings show that 
negative results can and have been published in the field. However, publication bias is still present, and consistent 
with this, we observed a drop in the frequency of p-values above .05. This suggests that some non-significant results 
have not been published. More promisingly, we found that researchers are likely making many correct statistical 
inferences at the individual-level. The strength of evidence of statistical effects at the group-level was weaker, and 
its p-value distribution was consistent with some effect sizes being overestimated. Studies such as ours can form part 
of a wider investigation into statistical reliability in comparative cognition. However, future work should focus on 
developing the validity and reliability of the measurements they use, and we offer some starting points.   
 
Keywords – Physical cognition, Folk physics, Evidence, Statistical inference, Publication bias 
 
Povinelli’s (2000) “Folk Physics for Apes” had a lasting impact on the study of animals' physical 
cognition. However, in “Folk Physics for Apes”, Povinelli also highlighted many of the issues at the 
forefront of science’s replication crisis (see Flis, 2019), such as replication (Open Science Collaboration, 
2015; Zwaan et al., 2018), falsification (LeBel et al., 2017), strong inference (Stevens, 2017) and being 
willing and able to interpret negative results (Lakens, 2017a). These issues focus on researchers’ 
statistical inferences, for example about how they may overestimate the support a significant p-value 
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gives for a given hypothesis (McShane et al., 2019). In contrast to statistical concerns, most criticism in 
animal physical cognition research has focused on construct validity, i.e., the extent to which tasks that 
researchers present to animals can provide diagnostic information on the cognitive processes that animals 
use (e.g., Ghirlanda & Lind, 2017; Hennefield et al., 2018). To date, there has been little assessment of 
the reliability and robustness of statistical inferences in the field. Motivated by the apparent success of 
meta-research projects in related fields, we conducted a preliminary assessment of statistical designs and 
reliability in a sample of animal physical cognition experiments.  
Statistical Design 
Sample Size and Statistical Biological Unit of Interest 
 
Our first aim was to evaluate the statistical design of the experiments in our sample of animal 
physical cognition research, specifically the sample size and the biological unit of interest. Small samples 
can lead to two problems. First, small sample sizes are often cited as a cause of statistical designs with 
low statistical power (e.g. Button et al., 2013), leading to overestimated effect sizes that are difficult to 
replicate and a distortion of the truth concerning the literature (Cumming, 2008; Fiedler & Prager, 2018; 
Hedges, 1984). Second, small samples may poorly represent the researcher’s overall target population, 
leading to over-generalized claims (Henrich et al., 2010; Hurlbert, 1984). However, research with small 
sample sizes has been used effectively throughout the history of comparative psychology. When 
experiments use many trials within each individual animal, their statistical tests can achieve high power to 
detect theoretically interesting effect sizes. This often occurs when researchers focus on the individual 
animal as the biological unit of interest, rather than the group (Smith & Little, 2018). In animal cognition 
research, the individual may be the most meaningful unit of analysis (Craig & Abramson, 2018): if an 
animal understands properties of the physical world, effects will manifest within this individual, but not 
necessarily at the level of the group. For example, when learning the trap tube task in Povinelli’s original 
work, Megan the chimpanzee was correct on 80/100 trials, (p = .000000000135); no other chimpanzee 
performed significantly above chance. As a result of these inter-individual differences, it would have 
made little sense to focus exclusively on the group. Although the group response is interesting, the most 
informative analyses will also examine effects at the level of the individual (for example by performing 
tests within each animal, or by building models with both group and individual effects). The first aim of 
our project was therefore to characterize the biological unit of interest (individual or group, or both) of the 
statistical analyses in each paper and the sample size that the researchers tested. This approach provided a 
basic description of the statistical designs used in our sample. 
Publication Bias and Statistical Reliability 
 
 Our second aim was to collect data on three indicators of statistical reliability and publication 
bias, namely, i) the prevalence of positive claims, which can be an indirect measure of publication bias, ii) 
the distribution of reported p-values, which can give clues to the overall strength of evidence that 
researchers are generating against null hypotheses, and, iii) the proportion of animals “passing” any given 
test, which can indicate the robustness of statistical conclusions across individuals. These three measures 
provide data about the reliability of research findings in physical cognition; if the literature has a large 
publication bias, or contains many just-significant p-values (i.e., around the alpha = .05 threshold), it will 
likely hold that these findings are difficult to replicate. Similarly, when only a small proportion of animals 
pass any given test of physical cognition, replication studies may “fail” because they miss these 
individuals in their samples. 
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Prevalence of Positive Claims  
 
 Publication bias leads to a literature filled with overestimated effect sizes (Hedges, 1984; 
Sterling, 1959), and facilitates the canonization of false facts (Nissen et al., 2016). To assess the severity 
of publication bias across scientific fields, researchers have investigated whether the literature contains an 
“excess” of positive results. This assumes that if a literature is filled exclusively with positive results, 
there are likely some unpublished negative findings, too. In one such study, Fanelli (2010) reported that 
just over 90% of a sample of psychology and psychiatry papers that contained the phrase “test* the 
hypothes*” reported support for the hypothesis under investigation, suggesting that many studies that did 
not support certain hypotheses were unpublished. However, the presence of publication bias in 
comparative psychology has largely been unstudied, which we aimed to examine in animal physical 
cognition research.  
P-Value Distributions and Evidential Strength 
 
 p-value distributions offer a window into the statistical reliability of a research field. First, if a set 
of studies have power to detect a predicted effect size, which turns out to be approximately true, the p-
value distribution from across these studies will be right-skewed, i.e., there will be more p-values in the 
interval 0 to .01, than in the interval .01 to .02, and more in this interval than between .02 and .03, and so 
forth. In contrast, the p-value distribution of a body of research examining false effects will be uniformly 
distributed, for most tests (Simonsohn et al., 2014). Comparing the shape of a research body’s p-value 
distribution to the shape of p-value distributions expected under different conditions therefore provides 
some information about the strength of evidence against null hypotheses (Lakens, 2017b; Simonsohn et 
al., 2014). Second, p-value distributions can offer a perspective on publication bias and false-positive 
inflating analysis practices. If the number of p-values reported just below .05 is disproportionally higher 
in the literature than the number of p-values reported just above .05, this suggests that either some p-
values have been coerced into falling below the significance threshold, or that effects above the 
significance threshold have not been published. We therefore recorded the p-values supporting the main 
claims in our sample of physical cognition research to provide data on the strength of evidence against 
null hypotheses across this body of research.  
Proportion of Animals “Passing” a Test 
 
Finally, we coded the number of animals reported to have “passed” each test of physical 
cognition, if such a test was performed. This number provides information on how generalizable certain 
individual-level effects are within the original sample, which may help to calibrate researchers’ 
expectations about the likelihood of replicating effects in new samples.  
Method 
 
The working introduction and methods for this paper were deposited before data collection at 
https://osf.io/3d9vh, and the final dataset and coding materials are available at https://osf.io/wkpeq/. 
Paper Inclusion 
 
This project attempted to code information from 200 published experiments in animal physical 
cognition studies. Papers were found using a keyword search in Scopus. Papers with titles, abstracts 
and/or keywords containing the following keywords: "folk physics" OR "physical cognition" were 
searched, returning 167 results on 26th November 2019. An error in an earlier search meant we had 
expected over 600 results from this search, and after realizing that the search returned only 167 results, 
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we performed a further search for “trap-tube” OR “trap tube” OR “trap table” OR “trap-table”, which 
returned a further 58 results. Papers were listed by ‘relevance,’ and the titles and abstracts of each paper 
were then screened for whether they fit our inclusion criterion: being a study of physical cognition in 
captive animals, which also included animals kept in captivity transiently for testing. For multi-
experiment papers and papers with many different conditions, two experiments or conditions were 
randomly selected for coding, using the function ‘sample’ in R 3.6.3. This procedure was decided to give 
greater representation to common designs used in animal physical cognition studies, while minimizing the 
extent our analysis would be biased by overweighting certain studies. 
Of the 167 papers from the first search, 60 were coded as fitting the inclusion criterion. An extra 
12 non-duplicate experiments from the trap-tube/trap-table search fitted the criterion and were added to 
the sample. A second screen of the full papers then led to 9 more studies being excluded: 7 for containing 
experiments outside of physical cognition or being developmental or personality studies, 1 for inability to 
access the paper, and 1 for the paper not being written in English. Of the remaining 63 papers, 53 
involved multiple physical cognition experiments, from which we randomly selected two experiments to 
be coded. This produced a total sample of 116 experiments from 63 papers. The 63 papers were published 
between 1994 and 2019, across 19 different journals. The journals with the largest number of papers in 
our sample were Animal Cognition (20), the Journal of Comparative Psychology (10), and Animal 
Behaviour (7). A complete reference list of the papers and journals included in this project can be found 
in Appendix A. There were 45 different species represented across the 63 physical cognition papers that 
we coded (Figure 1), with chimpanzees (8), New Caledonian crows (8), dogs (7), orangutans (6) and keas 
(6) being the most common.  
 
Figure 1  
The Number of Papers Investigating Each Species or Family in Our Sample of Physical Cognition Papers 
 
Note. The sample consisted of behavioral experiments on captive animal physical cognition and was sampled using a Scopus 
search for "folk physics" OR "physical cognition," and a variety of trap-tube and trap-table combinations. If a species was in 
more than one paper, this number is given in brackets after the species; e.g., there were 8 papers that included chimpanzees in the 
sample, and two papers including goats. 
The 63 papers contained different physical cognition tasks. Specifically: 14 papers used variants 
of the trap-tube task; 13 examined other forms of tool use; for example, testing the ability to select and 
use tools based on their properties or functionality; 11 examined animals’ responses in means-end, 
contact and string pulling tasks; 9 papers examined animals’ understanding about hidden objects, for 
example using object permanence, object-tracking and object choice tasks; 5 papers tested animals 
abilities to gain access to food; 3 papers used the physical tests from the Primate Cognition Test Battery; 
3 papers used support problems; 2 papers examined how birds chose nest building material; 1 paper tested 
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dogs’ understanding of solidity; 1 paper  investigated tool manufacturing in crows; and 1 paper 
investigated both means-end understanding and tool use in lemurs.  
Our sample is weakly representative of physical cognition research, and this sampling limits the 
ability of our analysis to characterize animal physical cognition research in general. Because of our search 
criteria, trap-tube and tool use studies are over-represented in our sample, some task formats are only 
represented once (e.g., water raising tasks), and some are not represented (e.g., violation of expectation 
tasks). Our sample is clustered around topics typically associated with “folk physics,” focusing on how 
animals manipulate objects to gain access to rewards, whether they respond to features of the environment 
such as connectivity and gravity, or distinguish between functional and non-functional tools. The sample 
does not include experiments on spatial cognition, or numerical cognition.  
Coding Protocol 
 
Two individuals coded each paper according to the protocol detailed below. An early version of 
the protocol was piloted on the first experiments of Povinelli’s “Folk Physics for Apes” (no experiments 
from Povinelli’s book were included in the analysis), and a second protocol was piloted on four non-
physical cognition studies. For each paper, the following features were coded: 
 
1. The main claim of the paper, coded from the abstract of each paper 
Coders were asked to copy and paste the sentence(s), from the abstract, containing the 
main claim the authors made from each paper. 
2. Whether this claim was “positive”, “negative” or “inconclusive.” 
Coders were asked to decide whether each claim was “positive”, “negative” or 
“inconclusive”. We defined positive claims as asserting the presence of a more 
exceptional ability in the animal, a novel effect, or the animal “passing” a test, negative 
claims as asserting the absence of a more exceptional ability in the animal, or the animal 
“failing” a test, and all other claims were labelled inconclusive. In addition to these 
definitions, coders were provided with more information about what would constitute a 
positive claim, namely “whether the paper was claiming that the animals are ‘clever’ or 
passed some criterion of physical cognition.” Alternatively, a positive claim could be a 
negative result in a control condition e.g., “the animal’s performance could not be 
explained only by a simple rule”), and an inconclusive claim could involve a positive 
result in a control condition, e.g., “although the animal passed the test, its performance 
could be fully explained by a simple rule as shown in the control condition”).  
3. The text of the primary group-level statistical inference made supporting the main claim, 
if applicable 
From the results section, or statistical analysis, coders were asked to copy the text of the 
group inference. Coders were asked to include the analysis that they thought was most 
central to the overall claim of the article, and to include any test statistics and p-values if 
they were present. 
4. The text of the primary individual-level statistical inference made supporting the main 
claim, if applicable. If multiple individual-level inferences were made supporting the 
main claim, we coded the first one presented.  
Similarly, coders were asked to copy the text of the individual inference, if present, from 
the results section or statistical analysis. Coders were asked to include the analysis that 
they thought was most central to the overall claim of the article, and to include any test 
statistics and p-values if they were present. If there were multiple individual-level 
inferences supporting a main claim, e.g., three animals passed a test, coders were asked to 
copy the first presented (that still supported the main claim).  
5. The sample size 
Coders were asked to report the number of animals recruited for the test. 
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6. The number of animals “passing” a test, if applicable  
This was performed only for experiments that had an individual-level statement, coders 
recorded how many animals “passed” the test in question.  
 
From the reported group-level and individual-level inferences, one author (BGF) then extracted 
the exact p-values from the texts of the group- and individual-level statistical inferences that were coded. 
For 44 experiments where non-exact values were reported, e.g., p < .05, we calculated them from the 
reported test statistics, if sufficient information was available. In four cases where an inequality was 
reported at a very low level, yet we did not have sufficient information to code the exact p-value, e.g., p < 
.00001 (N = 2) and p < .001 (N = 2), we included these as equalities in our analysis. We additionally 
planned to assess how researchers interpreted non-significant p-values; however, we decided that the 
number of non-significant p-values that we coded (16) was insufficient for any robust analysis.  
Coding and Reliability 
 
Coders were trained on four pilot studies, and any disagreement in this coding phase was used to 
refine the protocol. All 116 experiments of our final sample were double coded: BGF coded all of the 
experiments, and CAT, DA, JF and JvdM acted as second coders. Where there was disagreement between 
the double-coded items, this was resolved by a third coder by reference to the same coding protocol (AV, 
LO and SP). For all disagreements, the third coder’s decision was used in the final dataset, and in the 
three cases where the third coder’s decision disagreed with both the first and second coder, the third 
coder’s choice was retained after discussion with BGF. For the three variables that were coded by 
copying and pasting text, these were coded as agreeing if there was substantial overlap between the 
content of both coders, decided by BGF. This changed from the criteria we archived in our working 
methods, which was that the coders agreed if 50% of the text overlapped. We changed this criterion as the 
coders often varied in how much text they included, despite focusing on the same claim or inference.  
Analyses 
 
We first present descriptive data and visualizations of the following information: the distribution 
of species and groups from our sample, the sample sizes across the experiments, the frequency of positive 
and negative claims, the frequency of group-level and individual-level inferences, and p-value 
distributions for both group-level and individual-level inferences. We then use these data to explore the 
types of claims and strength of statistical inferences present in the animal physical cognition literature. 
We do the latter by qualitatively comparing the p-value distributions of the group-level and individual-
level data with simulated distributions from researchers studying only true statistical effects with 80% 
power, or studying zero true effects, i.e., 5% power (for simulation details, see Appendix B). We make 
only qualitative conclusions from these data due to their non-independence and uncertainty about the 
theoretical p-value distributions under the different hypothetical scenarios (80% power, 20% power and 
5% power). We explain this uncertainty in the Discussion section, as seeing the data first can help 





The first two coders agreed on 56 out of 63 (89%) claims from each paper’s abstract, Cohen’s 
kappa = .89, and agreed on 38 of 63 (60%) of their levels, i.e., whether the claims were positive, negative 
or inconclusive. This agreement rate was slightly lower than anticipated; however, all but two of the 
disagreements occurred when one of the coders labelled a claim “inconclusive” and the other labelled it as 
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either “positive” or “negative.” Accounting for the ordinal structure of the data, in which a disagreement 
between “positive” and “negative” is more severe than a disagreement between “positive” or “negative” 
and “inconclusive”, Cohen’s kappaweighted = .47. Coders agreed on 45 of 75 (60%) group-level inferences, 
Cohen’s kappa = .60, and 63 of 93 (68%) individual-level inferences, Cohen’s kappa =.68. Sample sizes 
were coded equally in 103 of 116 experiments, Cohen’s kappa = .89, and the number of animals passing 
each test was agreed in 56 of 94, Cohen’s kappa = .59. All disagreements were then resolved by a third 
coder to produce the dataset we used in the analysis. 
The inter-rater agreements for the group-level inferences, individual-level inferences, and claim 
levels were lower than anticipated. For the group-level and individual-level inferences, we performed our 
p-distribution analyses twice. Our primary analysis was performed on the inferences that both coders 
agreed with, or that the third coder decided on in cases of disagreement. Our robustness analysis used the 
inferences that both coders agreed on, and the inference that the third coder did not select in cases of 
disagreement (unless one of the original coders made a clear error, i.e., sometimes a coder would label an 
individual-level statistical test as a group inference, which BGF excluded from the robustness analyses). 
Perhaps more concerning was the lower inter-rater agreement for the claim level (60%). The following 
four reasons could explain this: i) our definitions being ambiguous and hence some claims being difficult 
to fit to them, ii) individual coders have response biases, iii) agreement on what the definitions mean but 
genuine disagreement on how to characterize the papers, and iv) typographical errors.  
To investigate this further, we asked the original coders to recode all 63 claims (the claims in 
which both original coders agreed, or the claim which was decided by the third coder). Six coders (BGF, 
AV, CAT, JvdM, LO, SP) completed the re-coding. Between these six coders, the 15 inter-rater 
agreements, i.e., all possible pairings of coders, were, in percent: 51, 62, 64, 67, 68, 68, 68, 68, 68, 70, 71, 
73, 76, 76 and 84. On average (median = 68%) this is slightly higher than the original 60%, and higher 
than chance (33%). This slightly higher agreement is likely due to the coders all having the same claim 
sentences to code, whereas in the original protocol, main claims were coded differently in 11% of cases. 
From this round of coding, we labelled the claims as positive, negative and inconclusive if most of the 
coders (4 or more out of 6) chose one of the three categories. Claims in which at least 3 coders chose 
inconclusive and 3 or less chose positive or negative were labelled as inconclusive. Figure 2 visualizes the 
inter-rater agreement; the 63 claims are presented sequentially along the x-axis, such that one column 
displays each coder’s decision for that claim. The red dashed line in Figure 2 shows how these claims 
were separated (negative leftmost, inconclusive center, positive rightmost). Our original coding (n = 2 
coders and a third coder for disagreements) produced 14 negative, 10 inconclusive and 39 positive claims, 
and the second coding (n = 6 coders) produced 11 negative, 15 inconclusive and 37 positive claims. The 
overall agreement, concerning the final classification of claims of “positive”, “negative” or 
“inconclusive”, between the two rounds was 86%.  
Figure 2 shows that most of the coders agreed on most of the claims, and when they did not, the 
disagreements centered on whether a claim should be labelled as inconclusive or positive, or inconclusive 
or negative. This suggests that a more continuous measure of claim levels might be useful in future 
research. Individual response biases also played a role: Coders One and Five (blue circles, green squares), 
preferred to code claims as more positive, whereas Coders Two and Four (blue triangles, blue crosses) 
were more likely to respond with inconclusive rather than positive. Overall, we feel this level of inter-
rater agreement is acceptable for our purpose of categorizing claims. However, perhaps more important 
was that our original definitions were vague. To assess the effects of vague definitions on the findings, we 
provided the same 6 coders with more specific definitions and example sentences, and again asked them 
to recode the 63 claims. For this round, which occurred one to two weeks after the previous round, the 
instructions given to the coders were as follows: 
 
Positive and negative claims will make a general statement about the cognitive abilities, processes or 
behavior displayed by the animals. Specifically: 
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Positive claims will include, but are not limited to, general statements about animals: having a certain 
cognitive ability; being able to pass a test; any claimed discovery of the processes animals use when 
passing a test (excluding “lower-order” processes); or confirmation of a general hypothesis. For example: 
 
Our results suggest that…  
 The animals understand physical causality 
 The animals understood the causal structure of the task 
 The animals are readily capable of passing the task 
The animals used a two-step procedure to pass the task, first assessing the causal 
structure and then selecting the most appropriate tool 
 Domestication has improved physical cognition in the animals 
The animals used X process to complete the task (where X process is not better 
categorized by the definitions for negative or inconclusive) 
 
Figure 2 
Inter-rater Agreement When All 63 Claims Were Re-coded by 6 Coders Using the Original Coding Criteria  
 
Note. The 63 papers are presented sequentially along the x-axis and each coder’s decision is presented on the y-axis (Positive, 
Inconclusive, Negative). Papers with most negative ratings are presented on the left-hand side, and papers with the most positive 
ratings are presented on the right. The red dashed lines indicate what category a particular paper was coded as when all the 
coders’ responses were taken into account: papers were coded as ‘Negative’ (leftmost) or ‘Positive’ (rightmost) when at least 4 
coders coded it as falling into that category, and papers were coded as ‘Inconclusive’ (center) when the number of coders coding 
the paper as either positive/negative or inconclusive was equally split, (i.e., 3 coders in each category).  
Negative claims will include general statements about the physical cognitive inability of animals, or their 
inability to pass a task and this not being caveated by an alternative explanation (such cases – where the 
inability is caveated – will typically be “inconclusive” and covered in a different category), or general 
evidence against a hypothesis. For example: 
 
Our results suggest that… 
 The animals do not understand physical causality 
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 The animals did not understand the causal structure of the task 
 The animals might not be capable of passing the task 
 Suggesting that domestication has not improved physical cognition 
 
Inconclusive claims will either not make strong epistemic statements but point to task specific confounds 
or task specific alternative explanations, OR they will report/refer to mixed evidence, i.e., some positive 
and some negative results OR a failure to confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. For example: 
 
 Even though the animals passed the test, this likely did not require a causal understanding 
 Even though the animals passed the test, they likely achieved this through a simple rule 
The animals may have understood some, but not all, of the physical properties of the task, 
and this was inconsistent between individuals. 
 
 Using the specific definitions, inter-rater agreement was comparable to the original definitions 
used: 54, 56, 65, 65, 67, 67, 68, 70, 71, 71, 73, 73, 79, 86. However, the new definitions produced fewer 
positive (28) or negative (6) claims, and more inconclusive (29) claims (Figure 3). The overall agreement, 
concerning the final classification of claims of “positive,” “negative” or “inconclusive,” between this 
second round and the original coding 70%. This discrepancy is largely accounted for by the increase in 
inconclusive claims under the new definitions. Interestingly, coders’ response biases were somewhat 
consistent across the two sets of definitions: Coders One and Five were again more likely to code claims 
as positive than the others, and Coder Two more likely to respond with inconclusive rather than positive.  
 
Figure 3 
Inter-rater Agreement When All 63 Claims Were Re-coded by 6 Coders Using More Specific Coding Definitions  
 
Note. The 63 papers are presented sequentially along the x-axis and each coder’s decision is presented on the y-axis (Positive, 
Inconclusive, Negative). Papers with most negative ratings are presented on the left-hand side, and papers with the most positive 
ratings are presented on the right. The red dashed lines indicate what category a particular paper was coded as when all the 
coders’ responses were taken into account: papers were coded as ‘Negative’ (leftmost) or ‘Positive’ (rightmost) when at least 4 
coders coded it as falling into that category, and papers were coded as ‘Inconclusive’ (center) when the number of coders coding 
the paper as either positive/negative or inconclusive was equally split, (i.e., 3 coders in each category). 
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Even though we were unable to increase our inter-rater agreement by providing more specific 
definitions, across the two rounds of coding, a relatively clear pattern emerged: some claims were clearly 
positive, some clearly negative and many intermediate. The intermediate claims, which we labelled 
“inconclusive” appeared continuously distributed. Some inconclusive claims were more “negative,” and 
others were more “positive,” and coders tended to agree when this was the case. Examples of these claims 
are presented in Table 1. Next, we present the results of our analyses.  
 
Table 1 
Examples of how Claims were Coded from Our Papers Across Two Rounds of Coding by 6 Individuals  
Claim level category Example  
Positive 
“The results indicate that kea are capable of assessing the spatial means–end relationships of this 
problem spontaneously and in a way that is comparable with primates.” (Auersperg et al., 2009) 
 
“Our results showed that tool-use training enhances mean performance in the physical cognition 




“Our subjects attended to at least two of the three tool features, although, as expected, the location 
of the hook was of paramount importance.” (St Clair & Rutz, 2013) 
Inconclusive 
“These data are consistent with the idea that apes may possess some specific causal knowledge of 
traps but may lack the ability to establish analogical relations between functional equivalent tasks.” 
(Martin-Ordas et al., 2008) 
 
“Both species [dogs and wolves] succeeded the visible displacement tasks but failed the invisible 





“Bonobos did not demonstrate an understanding of contact but showed more individual variation, 
attending to the positions of the food, disk, and stick.” (Helme et al., 2006) 
Negative 
“With the trap-tube task, we assessed whether the monkeys understood the cause-effect relation 
between their behavior and the outcome. The performances of the 4 subjects indicate that they did 
not take into account the effects of their actions on the reward.” (Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994) 
 
“Nevertheless, all 28 subjects failed to solve this task spontaneously, and showed no evidence of 
learning across 50 trials. Our results therefore call into question the earlier suggestion that dogs 
have, or can acquire, an understanding of the solidity principle.” (Müller et al., 2014) 
Sample Sizes and Biological Units of Interest 
 
In our sample, the sample sizes ranged from 1 to 56, with a median of seven individuals (Figure 
4). Eight of the experiments testing fewer than five individuals were transfer tasks. There was some 
evidence of species-specific differences in sample sizes, for example all corvid studies had a sample size 
of fewer than 10 individuals, whereas studies with canines and non-great ape primates sometimes had 
larger samples, for example over 50% of canine studies tested > 25 animals. Across the 116 experiments, 
40 experiments included both group- and individual-level inferences in support of their claims, 28 used 
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Figure 4  






From our two coding rounds in which six individuals coded each claim, we found that between 
28 and 37 of the 63 papers (44 - 59%) made positive claims. Between 6 and 11 (10 - 17%) papers made 
negative claims, and between 15 and 29 (24 - 46%) papers made inconclusive claims. Table 2 shows how 
these figures vary across groups, and although our sample size is small, corvids and great apes have the 
largest proportion of positive claims. 
P-values 
 
From the 68 group-level inferences, we had sufficient information to extract 58 exact p-values, of 
which 46 were < .05. From the 88 individual-level inferences, we had sufficient information to extract 49 
exact p-values, of which 41 were < .05. The density distributions of these significant p-values are plotted 
in Figure 5, alongside simulated distributions from research with 80% power to detect a true effect (“80% 
power simulation”, uppermost plot), research with 20% power to detect a true effect (“20% power 
simulation”, second from top), research where all null hypotheses were true (“False positive simulation”, 
third from top). 
Both the group- and individual-level statistical inferences have the largest density of p-values 
between 0 and .01, providing evidence of correct rejections of H0. This pattern is clear for the individual-
level inferences, which is consistent with research performed at relatively high power. Similar 
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distributions, albeit with slightly larger p-values for the individual inferences, were observed when we re-
performed the robustness analysis using the data from the second coder, when they disagreed with the 
primary and third coders, and are plotted in Figure 6.  
 
Table 2 
The Number of Each Type of Claim (Positive, Negative or Inconclusive) Made in the Sample of Physical Cognition Papers, by 
Study Group  
Group Positive Negative Inconclusive 
Great Apes 7; 4 1; 0 4; 8 
Primates 
Excluding great apes 
4; 4 1; 1 2; 2 
Canines 4; 2 1; 1 2; 4 
Mammals 
Excluding primates and canines 
3; 2 1; 0 1; 3 
Corvids 12; 9 0; 0 3; 6 
Parrots 4; 4 4; 2 1; 3 
Parrots and Corvids 0; 0 0; 0 1; 1 
Birds 
Excluding corvids and parrots 
3; 3 3; 2 1; 2 
 
Note. The first value comes from the first round of coding using the original definitions (N = 6 coders), and the second value 
from the second round of coding using the tighter definitions (N = 6 coders). The group “Parrots and Corvids” comes from a 
single paper that studied both groups. 
 
We performed two further exploratory analyses with the group-level p-values. The upper panel of 
Figure 7 displays the p-values as a function of sample size, with a red dashed line at p = .05, and the area 
.01 < p < .05 shaded. This graph provides weak evidence for larger sample sizes to produce smaller p-
values, however some very small p-values were still reported from studies with small sample sizes. The 
lower panel of Figure 7 is a histogram of the frequency of different p-values across the range 0 – .50. The 
number of p-values drops appreciably just above .05, suggesting that either some results just above this 
threshold are unpublished or that the p-value has been deflated to below the threshold. 
Animals Passing Each Test 
 
Of the 88 experiments making individual-level inferences, we were able to code the number of 
individuals who “passed” the experimental test from 87 experiments. In 15 experiments, no (zero) 
individuals passed the test. In the remaining 72 experiments in which individuals passed the test, the 
maximum number of individuals passing a test was 17 and the median was 3. The number of individuals 
passing each test, and the corresponding original sample size are plotted in Figure 8 (top panel). The 
proportion of animals passing the experimental tests varied substantially between experiments, from 0 
individuals in 15 experiments to 1 (all individuals) in 25 experiments. The median proportion of animals 
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Figure 5 
Raincloud Plot of Significant P-Values Observed in Our Physical Cognition Sample and From Simulated Research At Different 
Statistical Powers  
 
 
Note. For the simulated research, H1 was always correct for the research performed with 80% power (uppermost plot), 20% 
power (second panel from top), and H0 was always correct for the false positive simulation (third from top). The fourth panel 
from top displays the significant group-level Inferences from our sample of physical cognition research (N=46, Fourth Panel) and 
the bottom panel displays the significant results from the individual-level inferences from our sample of physical cognition 
research (N=41, Bottom Panel). The simulations and their density distributions contain 100,000 p-values each, however for 
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Figure 6 




Note. The top three panels display simulated research, and the bottom two the alternative p-values from our study. For the 
simulated research, H1 was always correct for the research performed with 80% power (uppermost plot), 20% power (second 
panel from top), and H0 was always correct for the false positive simulation (third from top). The fourth panel from top displays 
the significant group-level Inferences from our sample of physical cognition research (N=46, Fourth Panel) and the bottom panel 
displays the significant results from the individual-level inferences from our sample of physical cognition research (N=41, 
Bottom Panel). The simulations and their density distributions contain 100,000 p-values each, however for clarity a random 
sample of 200 raindrops are presented underneath the density plot.  
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Figure 7 




Note. On the upper panel, the x-axis gives the sample size and the y-axis the size of the reported p-value. The red dashed line 
denotes a p-value of .05 and the grey shaded denotes the area in which p-values fall between .01 and .05. The lower panel shows 
a histogram of the frequency of different p-values across the range of 0 – .50 (only 2 p-values fell between .50 and 1 so we 
excluded this range for clarity). The x-axis gives the p-values and the y-axis shows the frequency with which they are reported. 
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Figure 8 
The Number of Animals Passing Each Experimental Test, and the Corresponding Original Sample Size from Our Sample of 
Physical Cognition Research (Top Panel). The Proportion of Animals Passing the Test in Each Experiment from Our Sample of 




In this study, we collected data on the types of claims and statistical inferences used in a sample 
of physical cognition papers. Our sample contained some, but far from all, task formats used in animal 
physical cognition research: 14 variants of the trap tube task, 13 other tool use tasks, 11 means-end, 
contact and sting pulling tasks, 9 object choice, object tracking and object permanence tasks, 5 access 
tasks, 3 studies used the physical tests from the Primate Cognition Test Battery, 3 support problems, 2 
examined how birds choose nest building material, 1 paper tested dogs’ understanding of solidity, 1 
investigated tool manufacturing in crows and 1 investigated both means-end understanding and tool use 
in lemurs. Moreover, these tasks were not randomly sampled. As we used the search terms “physical 
cognition,” “folk physics” and “trap-tube” variations, specific findings or authors may be overrepresented 
– for example, some authors may be more likely to use the phrase “folk physics” than others, and some 
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not included at all (although no author was represented more than five times across our sample). Because 
of these sampling biases, the exact numbers for many of our measures are unlikely to be accurate 
representations of the field as a whole; however, the data provide patterns that are relevant to some 
general features of the literature.  
Statistical Design 
Sample Size and Biological Unit of Interest 
 
In line with previous reports of sample sizes in animal cognition research and comparative 
psychology (Craig & Abramson, 2018; Many Primates et al., 2019), we found that many experiments 
tested fewer than 10 animals, with a median of 7. However, we found sample sizes of greater than 20 for 
several species, for example, Kittler et al. (2018) tested 57 lemurs of three different species, Duranton et 
al. (2015) tested 47 dogs, and Joly et al. (2017) tested a total of 39 macaques of four different species. Our 
sample also did not include some experiments with very large sample sizes, such as Herrmann et al. 
(2007) who tested 107 chimpanzees and 32 orangutans on the Primate Cognition Test Battery, because 
the abstract, title or key-words of the paper did not include the terms  “physical cognition,” “folk physics” 
or “trap-tube.” 
Across the 116 experiments, 40 experiments included both group- and individual-level inferences 
in support of their claims, 28 used only group-level inferences and 48 only individual-level inferences. 
Hence, most experiments (88) focused, at least in part, on individual animals’ performances, consistent 
with suggestions that this is the appropriate level of analysis for many psychological theories (Barlow & 
Nock, 2009; Skinner, 1956; Smith & Little, 2018). However, focusing on the individual animal does not 
always resolve problems with small sample sizes. If only a small proportion of individuals will “pass” a 
test of physical cognition, then studies with small sample sizes risk missing such individuals altogether. 
We found that, in 13 experiments, between 1% and 25% of the sample passed the test at hand (Figure 8), 
showing that small sample sizes can still be a concern, even if researchers focus their statistical analyses 
on the individual. 
Publication Bias and Statistical Reliability 
 
Depending on our definition of positive, inconclusive, and negative claims, between 44% and 
59% of our sample made positive claims, between 24% and 46% made inconclusive claims, and between 
10% and 17% made negative claims. There was therefore no universal bias towards clearly positive 
claims in our sample and, given that our sample represented a host of major animal cognition journals, 
this finding might generalize to animal cognition research. However, we also found a noticeable drop in 
p-values just above the significance threshold for group-level inferences, which is, by definition, a marker 
of publication bias. Taken together, this suggests that, while it has been possible to publish negative and 
inconclusive results in physical cognition research, publication bias may still be an issue for the field. 
Importantly, the presence of publication bias likely interacts with researchers and research groups, with 
some being more likely to publish negative findings than others. Any literature-wide analysis, like our 
own, does not account for this interaction, and therefore may miss patterns of publication bias. However, 
a large proportion of positive and inconclusive claims, such as with corvids and great apes in our sample, 
does not mean that publication bias is present; it is also consistent with the animals genuinely performing 
well on most tasks. Estimating publication bias will therefore require a mix of research methods, such as 
survey measures, getting direct access to unpublished data or following-up on registered studies (Franco 
et al., 2014), in addition to the methods we have used here. Such methods will be most effective when 
they focus on narrow research questions and sufficient data are collected to examine individual research 
groups, editors, and journals.  
Rather than providing strong evidence about publication bias and statistical reliability in physical 
cognition research, our descriptive analysis illustrates one type of method that could provide such data in 
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the future. In our sample, the p-value distribution from the individual-level inferences was consistent with 
relatively high-powered tests at the individual-level. This was less of the case for the group-level 
inferences, which appeared more consistent with a mixture of high and low-powered tests and suggests 
that some effect sizes may be overestimated, and hence difficult to replicate (Farrar et al., 2020; Hedges, 
1984). We could not perform formal p-curve analyses with our data because p-curve analyses, to be 
effective, require i) independent data points; whereas we included multiple experiments from the same 
studies, and ii) the same hypothesis to be tested; whereas our sample included many different tests in 
many different species.  
Methodological Concerns and Future Research into Statistical Reliability and Publication Bias in 
Comparative Cognition 
 
 Our analysis indicates that even though negative and inconclusive reports have been published in 
animal physical cognition research, publication bias likely still influences the validity of the published 
literature. However, more importantly, the challenges we faced in the current study highlight general 
problems that studies attempting to quantify publication biases and statistical reliability in animal 
cognition will face.  
Sampling and Level of Analysis 
 
The generalizability of our findings is limited by our sampling method - a keyword search for 
terms sometimes used by researchers studying physical cognition (“physical cognition” and “folk 
physics”), which we biased further through adding the search term “trap tube.” Future research may wish 
to generate more comprehensive search terms to cover the population of studies in a research area or take 
a random sample of articles from across animal behavior and animal cognition journals. This will provide 
more comprehensive data on the statistical design of experiments. However, it is uncertain whether 
collecting more, and more representative, data is the best strategy for assessing statistical reliability using 
the methods we trialed here. P-distribution analyses, for example, are most valid when used to assess a 
family of research testing the same or very similar hypotheses (Simonsohn et al., 2014), and publication 
bias may be best viewed at the level of the individual research group, or journal. To address the 
prevalence of publication bias and the statistical reliability of animal cognition research, we suggest that 
researchers focus on generating high quality data across narrow domains, rather than data spread thinly 
across many different topics.  
Definitions and Reliability 
 
The inter-rater reliabilities of our measures were low, specifically when researchers assessed the 
level of a claim, which we attempted to categorize as positive, inconclusive, or negative, and the text of 
the main statistical inferences supporting these claims. Currently, it is unclear to us what “good” inter-
rater reliability scores will be for our questions, and while it should be possible to increase the inter-rater 
reliability through greater training and feedback for coders, or through more prescriptive definitions, we 
believe if such measures were used to generate near 100% inter-rater reliabilities, this would reduce the 
measures’ validities (Penders et al., 2019). In particular, we view the claim levels (positive, inconclusive 
or negative) as somewhat more like a survey measure than rote data extraction. However, it is clear that 
our definitions can be improved, and this may be achieved through generating more continuous 
measurement scales through a larger number of ordinal categories, or a 0-100 scale, or through using 
additional categories, such as splitting inconclusive into categories such “mixed-evidence” and 
“methodological problems.” While the validity and reliability of measures like the ones we used are being 
explored, researchers may be able to increase the robustness of their conclusions through using 
heterogeneous methods, for example by using multiple definitions, many coders, and multiverse-type 
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analyses. Overall, we believe that projects like our own will provide a valuable thread of information in a 
wider investigation of publication bias and statistical reliability in comparative cognition. However, 
further research is needed to establish exactly what these projects should measure, and the reliability and 
validity of the measurements they provide.  
Conclusion 
The present study analyzed 116 animal physical cognition experiments from 63 published journal 
articles. Sample sizes were small on average (median = 7), but some studies with larger sample sizes were 
also observed. Depending on the definitions we used to categorize positive, inconclusive, and negative 
claims, between 44% and 59% of our sample made positive claims, between 24% and 46% made 
inconclusive claims, and between 10% and 17% made negative claims. These data suggest that there was 
no universal bias towards positive results in our sample. Nevertheless, we observed a drop in the 
frequency of p-values reported above the significance level, suggesting the publication bias is still an 
issue in the field. Our p-distribution analysis suggests that researchers are often finding true statistical 
effects at the individual-level; however, some published group-level effects in animal physical cognition 
research may be overestimated. Finally, we encountered problems with our sample and the reliability of 
our measurements and discussed how they could be remedied as part of a larger body of research 
investigating publication bias and statistical reliability in comparative cognition. 
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Appendix A: Journals and references of the papers from which data were extracted  
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Appendix B: Simulation Details 
For Figures 5 and 6, data were simulated from two normal distributions for each of the four sets 
of simulations:  
 
Power Population 1 Population 2 
80% X ∼ N(50, 5) X ∼ N(52.02, 5) 
20% X ∼ N(50, 5) X ∼ N(50.81, 5) 
5% X ∼ N(50, 5) X ∼ N(50, 5) 
   
The difference between Population 1 and Population 2 was calculated to give the desired power 
for a two-tailed two sample t-test with n = 50 per group.  
100,000 samples were then taken from each Population and compared to each other, and the p-
values under .05 were plotted in Figures 5 and 6 alongside the p-values we sampled from the physical 
cognition literature. 
For Figures 5 and 6, the p-values we sampled from the physical cognition literature were plotted 
alongside a mixture model of research at 80% power (1/12 of all research), 20% power (2/3 of all 
research) and 5% power (1/4 of all research) from the same populations as Figures 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
